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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:02 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 this morning in Case 15-474, McDonnell v. United States.  
5 Mr. Francisco.

6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

8 MR. FRANCISCO: Mr. Chief Justice, and may  
9 it please the Court:

10 The government argues that in quid pro quo  
11 bribery, "official action" encompasses anything within  
12 the range of official duties. In order to reach that  
13 conclusion, it asks that you disregard a 9-0 decision of  
14 this Court.

15 The government is wrong. In order to engage  
16 in "official action," an official must either make a  
17 government decision or urge someone else to do so. The  
18 line is between access to decision-makers on the one  
19 hand and trying to influence those decisions on the  
20 other.

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And that's the Sun-Diamond  
22 case, the 9-0 case that you refer to.

23 MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor, the  
24 Sun-Diamond case, the 9-0 case. And I think what  
25 Sun-Diamond confirms is that when an official simply

1 refers someone to another official, an independent  
2 decision-maker for an objective decision, he hasn't  
3 crossed that line into prohibited "official action."

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I take it all parties  
5 concede that the act of the university official to  
6 undertake or not to undertake a research study would be  
7 an "official action."

8 MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor. And the  
9 question is: Did the Governor cross the line into  
10 influencing officials to undertake that action and was  
11 the jury properly instructed?

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you tell me the  
13 posture of the case with reference to under Virginia  
14 law, the government -- the Governor's authority or lack  
15 of authority to tell the university, you will engage in  
16 this research or you will not engage?

17 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure, Your Honor. He --

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is the state of the  
19 law, and do -- do the parties agree on this point?

20 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think that the  
21 parties agree that the Governor at least had a bully  
22 pulpit authority, but he had very little authority to  
23 actually direct any university researcher to do  
24 anything. And here I think one of the critical -- there  
25 are two critical questions: One, was the jury told that

1 it even had to find that he tried to do that and here it  
2 wasn't; and, two, did he in fact do that. And we would  
3 assert that he clearly didn't.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would it have made a  
5 difference if the medical faculties had agreed to the  
6 testing?

7 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, if they had  
8 agreed to the testing, I still don't think it would have  
9 made a difference in terms of whether Governor McDonnell  
10 tried to influence their decision on that, because he  
11 didn't. And it still wouldn't have made a -- a  
12 difference on the jury instructions because the jury  
13 still wasn't instructed that it had to find that  
14 Governor McDonnell tried to influence a particular  
15 governmental decision, because it wasn't so instructed.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Francisco, could I  
17 ask -- the line you're drawing between exercising  
18 influence and providing access, just to sort of test  
19 that with a hypothetical, suppose that somebody knew  
20 that there was a -- a contractor who was going to award  
21 a very large contract to one of two or three firms that  
22 the -- that he was meeting with. And -- and a company  
23 paid to make sure that they were on the meet list, to be  
24 one of those two or three firms, in other words,  
25 bribed --

1 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- an official in order to  
3 become one of those two or three firms from which that  
4 was the pool from which --

5 MR. FRANCISCO: Right.

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- this billion-dollar  
7 contract would emerge, would that be sufficient?

8 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think that  
9 probably would be "official action" because there the  
10 only way you can even get a decision in your favor is by  
11 being one of three people on that list. So being on  
12 that list is a prerequisite to getting a decision.  
13 Being denied -- denied on that list is a denial of the  
14 decision, and that's an official governmental action.

15 Here the jury wasn't instructed on any of  
16 this. They didn't have to find that Governor McDonnell  
17 tried to influence anything. Indeed, it would have been  
18 required to convict under these instructions if Governor  
19 McDonnell had called up a staff member and said, I'd  
20 like to -- you to meet with this fellow, Johnnie  
21 Williams. I don't really trust him. His product is a  
22 little hinky, but you're the expert. So meet with the  
23 guy and exercise your complete and unfettered judgment.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I --

25 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me -- let me just change

1 the hypothetical a little bit. Suppose that a Governor  
2 is going to make a -- eventually going to make a  
3 decision that will help either A or B and hurt either A  
4 or B, and the Governor says, you know, I'm going to have  
5 a preliminary discussion about this with members of my  
6 staff. We're not going to come to any decision, but  
7 we're going to talk about it. And whichever of you pays  
8 the most money will be able to sit in on this staff  
9 meeting. What about that?

10 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure. Well, Your Honor, I  
11 think I'd want to know, are there facts suggesting that  
12 it really isn't just a payment to sit in on the staff  
13 meeting? It's a payment to try to influence the  
14 meeting?

15 JUSTICE ALITO: Just a payment to sit in.

16 MR. FRANCISCO: To sit on the -- I think it  
17 would violate a whole lot of other laws, but I don't  
18 think, unless there was any kind of indicia that you  
19 were trying to influence the outcome, you would cross  
20 that line into prohibited "official action" corruption.

21 After all, these laws are not meant to be  
22 comprehensive codes of ethical conduct as this Court  
23 said in Sun-Diamond. They're meant to target the worst  
24 form of ethical misconduct, the corruption of official  
25 decision-making.

1 JUSTICE ALITO: What if it's not just  
2 sitting in? Maybe I wasn't -- I should sharpen this.  
3 Supposed the party is allowed to speak and present its  
4 point of view.

5 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, again, the more  
6 facts that you put on to suggest that it is more of an  
7 attempt to influence the decision, it's not just a  
8 meeting. I think the more likely you are to get to that  
9 "official act" --

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So tell me, what do we  
11 do with the evidence in the case that the university  
12 individuals who were assessing whether or not to do  
13 these studies themselves felt pressured? There is both  
14 testimony and documents in which the pros and cons of  
15 accepting these studies was discussed.

16 MR. FRANCISCO: Right.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And in the pro and con,  
18 it was, the Governor really wants us to do this.

19 MR. FRANCISCO: I --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The Governor is  
21 pressuring us to do this. We just don't think it's a  
22 good idea. They were honorable people, obviously. But  
23 the point is, what do we do with the fact that they  
24 perceived that he was trying to influence them?

25 MR. FRANCISCO: I have two responses, Your



1 Honor, a legal one and a factual one. Legally, you  
2 still need to instruct the jury that it had to find that  
3 Governor McDonnell tried to actually influence a  
4 government decision. And here it wasn't instructed, so  
5 they could have completely agreed --

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But why? Isn't this --  
7 I thought that this crime was taking money knowing that  
8 it was being paid to influence an "official act." So  
9 aren't all of these examples of "official acts" whether  
10 they are or they aren't irrelevant? The question is,  
11 what was his intent at the moment he took the money?  
12 And why couldn't --

13 MR. FRANCISCO: Yeah.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- a jury infer at that  
15 moment that he took it with the intent to commit an  
16 "official act" the way Mr. Williams wanted it committed?

17 MR. FRANCISCO: So again, Your Honor, two  
18 responses. Even assuming that the jury could have  
19 inferred it, you still need to tell them what an  
20 "official act" is, that an "official act" is an attempt  
21 to influence a governmental decision.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well --

23 MR. FRANCISCO: Understand --

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- to study these  
25 dietary supplements.

1                   MR. FRANCISCO: Well, to -- to actually, you  
2 know, conduct tobacco commission-funded State studies,  
3 but you still need to tell them what that is. But I'll  
4 get directly to your question. Why is it that the  
5 actual "official acts" are relevant? And that's because  
6 both the district court and the courts of appeals'  
7 opinions made clear.

8                   Here in this case, the corrupt agreement  
9 turned entirely upon, as the district court case said.  
10 It hinged upon whether the five specific acts were, in  
11 fact, "official acts," because in the absence of any  
12 direct evidence of a corrupt agreement, the government's  
13 argument was that you could infer one from the pattern  
14 of actual "official acts" on the one hand and the  
15 pattern of gifts and loans on the other and the temporal  
16 connection between the two.

17                  JUSTICE KENNEDY: And so is it your position  
18 at page 60 of the supplemental Joint Appendix -- the  
19 instructions aren't numbered, which makes it a little  
20 hard, but the judge instructs the jury that "official  
21 actions" are set forth in the five paragraphs of the  
22 indictment. And is it your position that at least some  
23 of those are not "official acts"?

24                  MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor, and  
25 certainly the five things that were proved in this case

1 are not "official acts." And likewise, I don't think  
 2 any of those things, as they actually came into  
 3 evidence, demonstrated "official acts" because in none  
 4 of them did Governor McDonnell cross that line in trying  
 5 to influence the outcome of any particular decision.  
 6 And just as critically, the jury was never told it had  
 7 to find that. So the jury in this case, Justice  
 8 Sotomayor, could have completely agreed with our version  
 9 of the facts. It could have agreed that as we argued  
 10 very vigorously that the most that Governor McDonnell  
 11 did here was refer Johnnie --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The matter --

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, this gets back  
 14 somewhat to Justice Alito's hypothetical about arranging  
 15 the meeting, and we -- and we can up the ante to see  
 16 how -- how close the meeting came to be an -- an  
 17 "official act." But I -- I take it that at some point  
 18 your position is that a governmental -- that an  
 19 "official act" must be the exercise of governmental  
 20 power. Is that your position?

21 MR. FRANCISCO: Well, Your Honor, it's  
 22 either making a decision on -- on an exercise of  
 23 governmental power, trying to influence it, as in the  
 24 Birdsall case, where the defendants there were trying to  
 25 persuade the grant of clemency.

1           But if you're simply setting up a meeting so  
2   that somebody can appeal to the independent judgment of  
3   an independent decisionmaker and you're not trying to  
4   put your thumb on the scale of the outcome of that  
5   meeting, then that simple referral can't possibly be  
6   official action. After all, government officials refer  
7   friends and benefactors to staff members all the time in  
8   order to avoid taking official action.

9           JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you -- do you concede  
10   that there is sufficient evidence in this record --  
11   let's say we accept your argument about the charge being  
12   insufficient. But this could go back, and a jury could  
13   be asked: Did the Governor try to influence a decision  
14   on the part of the medical faculties?

15          MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, we don't concede  
16   there was sufficient evidence. But regardless, we -- we  
17   also argue that the jury was improperly instructed on  
18   this, which, Justice Sotomayor, goes to the point, I  
19   think, you were making. If the jury was improperly  
20   instructed, then you don't actually assume all of the  
21   evidence in favor of the government. The question then  
22   becomes: Could a -- would a properly-instructed juror  
23   have been required to convict?

24          Here, even if the jury completely agreed  
25   with us, and they very well may have, under these

1 erroneous instructions they still would have been  
2 required to convict, because under these instructions,  
3 simply referring somebody to a meeting without trying to  
4 influence the outcome of that meeting constitutes  
5 official governmental action.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, suppose  
7 arranging a meeting could be official government action,  
8 if that were your job. In other words, you're not just  
9 a secretary, but your job was to manage the Governor's  
10 schedule. You decided who met with him, you decided  
11 when, and that -- that's your job. That's -- so  
12 anything that individual does, I suppose, would be an  
13 official act.

14 MR. FRANCISCO: I think that's possible,  
15 Chief Justice. Of course, in this case we don't have  
16 anything like that. We simply have referrals to  
17 meetings with other officials so that, at best, the  
18 alleged bribe payor here, Jonnie Williams, can try to  
19 persuade them to his cause.

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, can I follow up on  
21 that? Because what you just suggested, right, is that  
22 you could -- suppose that there were a scheduler for a  
23 Governor or for the President or whatever, and that  
24 scheduler was selling meetings. So you would think  
25 that's part of her job? And if I just understood you

1 correctly, that falls within the statute?

2 MR. FRANCISCO: No, Your Honor. I think  
3 that would be a very close case. That -- that would be  
4 a very close case, because at the end of the day, if  
5 you're not actually making a governmental decision or  
6 influencing the outcome of an actual governmental  
7 decision, I think you -- and Chief Justice, you might  
8 actually be violating a lot of other laws, including the  
9 separate provision in Section 201 that prohibits you  
10 from undertaking any act in violation of your official  
11 duties in exchange for money, or 5 U.S.C. 7353, which  
12 prohibits you from -- from taking anything from anyone  
13 whose interests could be affected by the performance or  
14 nonperformance of your duties.

15 But I think that the line has to be, and the  
16 only line that comes out through the cases is, you're  
17 actually either making a decision on because of the  
18 government, or you're urging someone else to do so.  
19 You're trying to pushing them in a certain direction.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: It seems to me when you say  
21 "urging" -- now, wait. See, I can go back to a lot of  
22 different commission, the Brown Commission, the Senate  
23 S1, the language of the statute, and I read "official  
24 action," something quite similar to the statute here, "A  
25 decision, opinion, recommendation, judgment, vote, or

1 other conduct" -- perhaps other similar conduct --  
2 "involving an exercise of discretion."

3 So in this case, the official action we're  
4 talking about is giving money to a group of people in  
5 the university to conduct a study.

6 Now, the Governor didn't do that. But a  
7 person who tries to influence an official action and is  
8 also in the government is also guilty. But wait.  
9 That's the Indian case.

10 MR. FRANCISCO: Yes. You're correct.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: But wait. The word  
12 "influence" is too broad, because every day of the week  
13 politicians write on behalf of constituents letters to  
14 different parts of the government, saying, will you  
15 please look at the case of Mrs. So-and-so who was  
16 evicted last week? And that's so common, you can't pick  
17 that up.

18 But then you use the word "urge." That's  
19 not exactly a legal word. And what I'm looking for is a  
20 set of words that will describe in both sides' positions  
21 what we should write as the words that describe the  
22 criminal activity involved in talking to or influencing  
23 the person who does create the official act, like give a  
24 pardon.

25 MR. FRANCISCO: Right.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Like award a contract, like  
2 vote, like -- et cetera. Now, those are the words that  
3 I can't find, and I'd appreciate your opinion.

4 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure, Your Honor. And I  
5 think that the answer is that what district courts have  
6 to do is understand the general rule, which I think at  
7 some level has to be an attempt to influence, and then  
8 flesh it out in a way that's appropriate to the facts of  
9 the case.

10 JUSTICE BREYER: You want to use "attempt to  
11 influence"? My goodness. Letters go by the dozens over  
12 to the secretary of HUD, to the secretary --

13 MR. FRANCISCO: Right.

14 JUSTICE BREYER: -- of -- of HHS, to the  
15 secretary or the assistant secretaries, and they say, my  
16 Constituent Smith has a matter before you that has been  
17 pending for 18 months; we would appreciate it if you  
18 would review that and take action. And then the elected  
19 official says to Smith, I did my best on this. And  
20 Smith thinks, good, he's used his influence.

21 MR. FRANCISCO: Right.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: A crime? My goodness.

23 MR. FRANCISCO: Absolutely not, Your Honor.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Fine.

25 MR. FRANCISCO: Absolutely not.



1 JUSTICE BREYER: You say "absolutely not."

2 That's what I thought that you would say.

3 MR. FRANCISCO: And I think that --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: So I want to know -- but  
5 the words you used were "attempt to influence." And so  
6 -- though I don't think that's the right word, and I  
7 want to know what the right words are --

8 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: -- in the instruction that  
10 the judge is going to give. Not in your case --

11 MR. FRANCISCO: Um-hmm.

12 JUSTICE BREYER: -- but in general.

13 MR. FRANCISCO: Well, can I give you an  
14 example from another case that, although I do think  
15 instructions are generally tailored to the case, an  
16 example --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Of course they are. But  
18 you have to have the standard that will distinguish the  
19 urger --

20 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: -- from the one who does it  
22 criminally and the one who doesn't.

23 MR. FRANCISCO: And in the Ring case, I  
24 thought that Judge Huvelle had some very useful  
25 instructions --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Mm-hmm.

2 MR. FRANCISCO: -- where she wrote -- and  
3 this is at page 1083 of the Joint Appendix --  
4 "Therefore, 'official action' includes the exercise of  
5 both formal official influence, such as the  
6 legislature's vote on legislation, and informal official  
7 influence, such as a legislature's behind-the-scenes  
8 influence on other public officials in the legislative  
9 or executive branches."

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, there we have it.  
11 There we have it. All these letters going over, saying,  
12 please look at Mrs. Smith's eviction notice.

13 MR. FRANCISCO: And --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: Mrs. Smith, who, by the  
15 way, took me to lunch last week.

16 (Laughter.)

17 MR. FRANCISCO: And I completely agree, Your  
18 Honor, which is why in our proposed instruction --

19 JUSTICE BREYER: That won't do it. The one  
20 you just read won't do it.

21 MR. FRANCISCO: Well -- well, and that's why  
22 in our proposed instructions, I think it needs to be  
23 tailored further to the facts of the case. So in our  
24 case we went on to say -- say merely arranging a  
25 meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or

1 making a speech are not standing-alone "official acts."

2 Either you use it --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So you use

4 that. The key to the word in there is "merely."

5 MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor.

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Because sometimes it could.

7 MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor.

8 JUSTICE BREYER: And somebody might have the  
9 embarrassing question, merely when it can or merely when  
10 it can't. Give me a little enlightenment.

11 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think that the  
12 answer is, if -- if the evidence shows that there was --  
13 and I hate to go back to the word that I -- I know you  
14 don't like here, but if the evidence shows that there  
15 really wasn't attempt -- an attempt to try to push the  
16 separate decisionmaker that you're supposedly trying to  
17 influence one way or another, but you really are just  
18 sending it over for a meeting, and -- and that  
19 independent decisionmaker is left to their independent  
20 judgment, then you haven't crossed that line. But if --

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. --

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The word -- the word that  
23 Justice Breyer is concerned about comes from Birdsall,  
24 with intent to influence their "official action." So we  
25 can hardly fault the district judge for using in Ring

1 the same words that this Court used in Birdsall.

2 MR. FRANCISCO: I -- I agree, Your Honor. I  
3 thought that Judge Huvelle did a very good attempt at  
4 defining, because she actually went further than what I  
5 just read to you, Justice Breyer. She continues along  
6 the lines that we proposed in our instructions that,  
7 quote, "Mere favoritism as evidenced by a public  
8 official's willingness to take a lobbyist's telephone  
9 call or to meet with the lobbyist, is not an 'official  
10 act.'"

11 So I think that the idea is, Your Honor -- I  
12 understand, Justice Breyer, that influence itself  
13 doesn't totally solve the problem. But what district  
14 court judges do is they then explain to the jury what  
15 they mean by influence, and influence is not --

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Where can we find the best  
17 definition, in your view, of an "official act"?

18 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think that the  
19 best definition of an "official act" is -- is  
20 essentially the one that I tried to articulate at the  
21 outset. You need -- you need to either make a decision  
22 on behalf of the government, or try in some way to use  
23 your influence to pressure or urge or persuade or cajole  
24 someone else who has governmental power to make a  
25 decision on an action.

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I --

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I --

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I agree with Justice  
4 Breyer. I just don't see the limiting principle in the  
5 second part.

6 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I think in many  
7 -- in some cases, I think the limiting principle might  
8 be difficult; it's not a perfect and precise  
9 formulation. But I think in this case it's a  
10 particularly easy principle, because here the jury  
11 wasn't given any instruction on the line at all.

12 So Justice Breyer, in your hypothetical,  
13 sending that letter over is an "official act" under the  
14 instructions as given and under the theory pushed by the  
15 Solicitor General's office in this case because it is  
16 the action --

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm -- I'm not sure -- I'm  
18 not sure that's right. It seemed to me the "official  
19 act" is exercise of governmental power to require  
20 citizens to do or not to do something, or to shape the  
21 law that can -- that governs their conduct.

22 MR. FRANCISCO: I -- I completely agree with  
23 you, Justice Kennedy.

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Under your view, under the  
25 hypotheticals that have been thrown around, the janitor

1 who gets the bottle of beer in order to clean your  
2 classroom first, I mean, is that -- is that a  
3 governmental act?

4 MR. FRANCISCO: Certainly not in my view,  
5 but the government --

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, what's the  
7 difference?

8 MR. FRANCISCO: The difference is, one --  
9 one is you're exercising power on behalf of the  
10 government as a whole. So the janitor, for example, if  
11 he's buying -- if he's using government money to buy  
12 janitorial supplies and engaging in government  
13 contracting, that's an exercise of governmental power.  
14 If you're simply cleaning out a classroom, I don't think  
15 you're exercising government power.

16 So, too, when you simply send somebody to  
17 another official for an independent and objective  
18 decision by that official, but you don't try to put your  
19 thumb on the scales of that decision, you haven't  
20 crossed the line.

21 And I think it's very important in a  
22 criminal statute like this, because if you really do  
23 think that a referral, just simply making a referral, is  
24 "official action" that crosses the line into bribery, I  
25 think you do have some very serious vagueness concerns

1 with the Hobbs Act and on a services question --

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I ask --

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure -- sure. It  
4 depends on who's making the referral or the call, right?  
5 In Justice Breyer's hypothetical, if it's a  
6 congressperson calling somebody and saying, could you  
7 look into this matter for my constituent, the person  
8 should look at it, I suppose, and then -- and that's one  
9 thing. If it's the President who calls and says, I want  
10 you to look at this matter for my constituent, that  
11 might exercise considerably more influence.

12 MR. FRANCISCO: Two things, Your Honor.  
13 First, you still do need to tell the jury that that's  
14 what they have to find. And here, the jury was never  
15 told in any way, shape or form that they had to find an  
16 attempt to influence. So I think that is sufficient, in  
17 and of itself, to, at the very least, require a new  
18 trial here.

19 Under these instructions, as the government  
20 itself seems to agree, any action within the range of  
21 official duties constitutes official governmental  
22 action.

23 So Justice Kennedy, in the letter being sent  
24 over from a senator, since that is within the range of  
25 official duties, that counts under the government's

1 formulation, and under the jury instruction as given,  
2 since it is, after all, a settled practice of officials  
3 to send these kinds of letters. That's why it was  
4 incumbent upon the district court to draw some kind of  
5 limit.

6 And here, the jury could well have agreed  
7 with us that even though he was the governor of the  
8 State, Mr. Chief Justice, he did not try to influence  
9 the actual decision. He simply made the same type of  
10 referral that he made day in and day out during this  
11 administration where he simply sent a constituent to the  
12 appropriate official --

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Francisco --

14 MR. FRANCISCO: -- to exercise appropriate  
15 judgment.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- if -- you said something  
17 before, and I might have misunderstood you. But do you  
18 think that -- of the five listed "official acts," do you  
19 think none of them meet the standards that you're  
20 suggesting, or do you think some of them do and some of  
21 them don't?

22 MR. FRANCISCO: Two answers. First of all,  
23 we don't think that any of them meet the standard.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So let me --

25 MR. FRANCISCO: But secondly --



1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Go ahead, please.

2 MR. FRANCISCO: But secondly, the jury could  
3 have agreed with us on that, given the evidence we put  
4 further. And therefore, the erroneous instruction was  
5 critical to this case, because even if they had agreed  
6 with us, they would have been required to convict under  
7 that erroneous instruction since -- take the healthcare  
8 leaders reception. They could have concluded that that  
9 was an "official act" and that was the only basis to  
10 convict, and they could have agreed with our evidence on  
11 everything --

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. That -- that might be  
13 right. It might be that -- that you still have a -- a  
14 winning argument even if some of the five are fine.  
15 But -- but if we could just focus on them for a bit. I  
16 mean, for example, the third one --

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: They're -- they're at page  
18 60 of the --

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: The 6091.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Middle of the appendix.

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: Contacting other officials  
22 to influence Virginia State researchers to initiate  
23 clinical studies. So that's the one that seems to me to  
24 really fall within your own definition. Do you disagree  
25 with that?

1                   MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, I don't. And if  
2 they had actually proved what was said in the indictment  
3 in the case, I think that this would be a -- we'd be  
4 making a different argument here. But the problem is,  
5 they didn't prove that Governor McDonnell tried to  
6 encourage anybody. The one --

7                   JUSTICE KAGAN: So on something like that,  
8 your argument is a sufficiency argument?

9                   MR. FRANCISCO: Yes, Your Honor.

10                  JUSTICE KAGAN: Rather than this was -- this  
11 is not an "official act"?

12                  MR. FRANCISCO: And -- and -- yes, Your  
13 Honor. To be clear, we have two separate arguments  
14 here. One is on the jury instructions where our  
15 argument is that even if they agreed with all of our  
16 view of the facts, they still would have been required  
17 to convict, given these erroneous jury instructions.

18                  And secondly, our second argument is the  
19 sufficiency argument. Even a properly instructed jury,  
20 in our view, could not have concluded that Governor  
21 McDonnell crossed that line.

22                  JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, just to be clear,  
23 you -- you said at the outset you don't think any of  
24 these are "official acts," but then I thought I heard  
25 you say that, third, contacting other government

1 officials as part of an effort to encourage State  
2 research is not an "official act"?

3 MR. FRANCISCO: That's the indictment, Your  
4 Honor. If they had actually proved what was --

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What was -- Justice Kagan  
6 is asking, is that an "official act"?

7 MR. FRANCISCO: If it actually --

8 JUSTICE KAGAN: If it's true, but --

9 MR. FRANCISCO: If he had tried to  
10 encouraged them to do it, yes. If they had proved that  
11 he had tried to encourage them to do that, that would  
12 have been an "official act."

13 Our argument is that, first, the jury was  
14 never properly instructed on that question; and second,  
15 he never did in fact urge university researchers to do  
16 anything.

17 And if I could just conclude, before  
18 reserving the remainder of my time for rebuttal, at the  
19 one event where he actually had direct contact with the  
20 university researchers, Justice Kagan, this was the  
21 luncheon held at the mansion. The -- all of the  
22 witnesses who were there actually testified as to two  
23 things with respect to the Governor.

24 First, he simply asked neutral questions  
25 that didn't try to push the researchers' decisions one

1 way or another. And secondly, the one time Jonnie  
2 Williams asked him for something, support before Tobacco  
3 Commission funding, he gave Jonnie Williams a very  
4 polite no.

5 Mr. Chief Justice, if I could reserve my  
6 time.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

8 Mr. Dreeben.

9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN

10 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

11 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,  
12 and may it please the Court:

13 Petitioner seeks a categorical carve-out  
14 from the concept of an "official act" for things like  
15 meetings, phone calls, events, that, in his view, do not  
16 further or advance or attempt to influence a particular  
17 government action, but simply provide somebody with  
18 access to the government.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, he's not --  
20 he's not the only one. One -- there's an extraordinary  
21 document in this case, and that's the amicus brief filed  
22 by former White House counsel to President Obama, former  
23 White House counsel to President George W. Bush, former  
24 White House counsel to President Clinton, former White  
25 House counsel to George H.W. Bush, former White House

1 counsel to President Reagan. And they say, quoting  
2 their brief, that "if this decision is upheld, it will  
3 cripple the ability of elected officials to fulfill  
4 their role in our representative democracy."

5 Now, I think it's extraordinary that those  
6 people agree on anything.

7 (Laughter.)

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But -- but to agree  
9 on something as sensitive as this and to be willing to  
10 put their names on something that says this -- this  
11 cannot be prosecuted conduct. I think is extraordinary.

12 MR. DREEBEN: It may be extraordinary, Mr.  
13 Chief Justice, but that doesn't make it correct. I  
14 think it rests on several fundamental misconceptions  
15 about what government actually does. And I think it's  
16 important to pause and look at the implications of what  
17 Petitioner's pay-to-play theory of government really is;  
18 that people can pay for access, that they can be charged  
19 to have a meeting or have a direction made to another  
20 government official to take the meeting.

21 It would mean, in effect, that if somebody  
22 came to me and said, you know, I know you're having a  
23 lot of college tuition issues. We can help you with  
24 that. The criminal division is not giving us a meeting  
25 on whether to appeal a case. Just call them and see if

1     you can get them to take the meeting. And I don't  
2     know --

3                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You're --

4                   JUSTICE KENNEDY: I don't know --

5                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's -- it's  
6     somebody in the government whose client comes to them  
7     and says, we'd really like the Solicitor General's  
8     Office to file a brief in our case. And then that  
9     person calls you up and says, can you meet with  
10    so-and-so? All he wants to do is sit down with you and  
11    persuade you why you should file a brief supporting his  
12    case.

13                  MR. DREEBEN: But getting in the door, Mr.  
14    Chief Justice, is one of the absolutely critical things.

15                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So is your answer,  
16    yes, that that's a felony?

17                  MR. DREEBEN: If somebody pays me --

18                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no. That's the  
19    quid -- that's the quid side of it.

20                  MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

21                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm talking about  
22    the pro side in the quid pro quo.

23                  MR. DREEBEN: Taking a meeting, yes, I think  
24    taking a meeting is absolutely government action.

25                  JUSTICE KENNEDY: So if -- so if the

1 President gives special access to high-dollar donors to  
2 have meetings with government officials, that is a  
3 felony?

4 MR. DREEBEN: Certainly not, Justice  
5 Kennedy. And I --

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why certainly not?

7 MR. DREEBEN: Because the critical issue  
8 there is whether the government can prove a quid pro  
9 quo. And now we're moving into the realm of campaign  
10 contributions, where this Court has given very strict  
11 guidance about when a jury --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: It's not a campaign  
13 contribution. What it is, is he takes him to lunch, and  
14 an expensive lunch at that. Okay? Because the quid  
15 side is not limited. The government has argued  
16 continuously that in for a penny, in for a pound. Okay?  
17 So we don't have the limitation on the quid side. We  
18 have a possible limitation in frame of mind.

19 And now we're looking to the quo side. And  
20 you want to remove any limitation there. Okay?

21 Now, why do I think that's a problem? Two  
22 very fundamental reasons. And it's not because I'm in  
23 favor of dishonest behavior. I'm against it. And we  
24 have just listed some that is dishonest. My problem is  
25 the criminal law as the weapon to cure it. And if the

1 criminal law is the weapon that goes as far as you want,  
2 there are two serious problems. One, political figures  
3 will not know what they're supposed to do and what  
4 they're not supposed to do, and that's a general  
5 vagueness problem.

6           And the second is, I'd call it a separation  
7 of powers problem. The Department of Justice in the  
8 Executive Branch becomes the ultimate arbiter of how  
9 public officials are behaving in the United States,  
10 State, local, and national. And as you describe it, for  
11 better or for worse, it puts at risk behavior that is  
12 common, particularly when the quid is a lunch or a  
13 baseball ticket, throughout this country.

14           Now, suddenly, to give that kind of power to  
15 a criminal prosecutor, who is virtually uncontrollable,  
16 is dangerous in the separation of powers since. So in  
17 my mind -- right in this case, nothing to do with this  
18 Petitioner, nothing to do with him, but in this case, is  
19 a -- as fundamental a real separation of -- of powers  
20 problem as I've seen.

21           And -- and I'm not quite certain what the  
22 words are. They won't be perfect. They will leave some  
23 dishonest conduct unprosecuted. They won't be perfect.  
24 They will put some politicians at risk. But I'm  
25 searching for those words because, as I said, this is a



1 very basic separation of powers problem for me.

2 MR. DREEBEN: So --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: I appreciate your help on  
4 what the right words are, and I'll tell you right now if  
5 those words are going to say when a person has lunch and  
6 then writes over to the antitrust division and says, I'd  
7 like you to meet with my constituent who has just been  
8 evicted from her house, you know, if that's going to  
9 criminalize that behavior, I'm not buying into that, I  
10 don't think.

11 So -- so I want some words that will help  
12 with what I see as as naughty and complicated and  
13 difficult and basic a problem as I can think of.

14 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Breyer, let me first  
15 argue the position that I came here to argue, which is  
16 that "official action" is not limited by some arbitrary  
17 litmus test that was proposed by Petitioner that would  
18 exclude things that he calls "access." I don't think  
19 that that's the right way to look at it. I think that  
20 the right way to look at this statute is to recognize  
21 that it has multiple elements. We're talking about  
22 multiple statutes. But the bribery offense has very  
23 similar elements.

24 You first have to decide whether someone is  
25 engaging in an "official act." Merely going to lunch is

1 not engaging in an "official act." There are  
2 opportunities to engage --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no one said it is. The  
4 lunch with the Chateau Lafite wine happens to be the  
5 quid, and -- and that's worth, like, a thousand dollars,  
6 or 500, anyway. I don't go to those restaurants  
7 anymore.

8 (Laughter.)

9 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Breyer --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: But -- but you understand  
11 that --

12 MR. DREEBEN: -- I -- I don't -- I don't  
13 go --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: -- side. It's the other  
15 side of the equation.

16 MR. DREEBEN: I understand, Justice Breyer.  
17 But what -- I would think it would be helpful for the  
18 Court if I could lay out the multiple elements that are  
19 at issue here because "official act" does not have to do  
20 all the work. You do have to have somebody engaged in  
21 their official capacity. You then have to have  
22 something that they do within their range of official  
23 duties, which going to lunch is not going to be.

24 Third, you need a quid pro quo, which means  
25 that the government is going to have to show that the

1 person allowed themselves to be influenced in their  
2 conduct by the thing of value that they received, which  
3 is to say that somebody is basically saying, I'm going  
4 to make a referral over to another agency for you only  
5 if you buy me lunch. That is not honorable behavior,  
6 and there are --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Of course it isn't.

8 MR. DREEBEN: -- many regulations that carve  
9 out permissible gift situations and create the fourth  
10 element issue that I think is an important protection,  
11 which is mens rea.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the problem is, and as  
13 you set forth in your brief correctly, you can imply an  
14 agreement over time. You can imply a contract over  
15 time. And if the lunch takes place first and there's --  
16 there's no precondition on the lunch, but after the  
17 lunch there is wink-wink, nod-nod, and the contact takes  
18 place, it's clear in the standard criminal law that  
19 there is a conspiracy there.

20 MR. DREEBEN: So I agree with you --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: We're in agreement.

22 MR. DREEBEN: I do agree with you, Justice  
23 Kennedy. I think that's exactly the position that Your  
24 Honor's opinion in Evans, the separate concurrence,  
25 explained as a proper means of administering the quid

1 pro quo requirement as an intent to issue in a criminal  
2 case. There is a very critical protection here. It's a  
3 requirement of showing something beyond a reasonable  
4 doubt to a jury. And if you have ordinary conduct  
5 that's fully disclosed and in accordance with  
6 regulations which do strictly limit when people can  
7 receive lunches --

8 JUSTICE ALITO: I don't see what the  
9 relevance of those regulations is. You say -- you say  
10 there were certain safe harbors created by Federal  
11 regulations. Those apply to Federal employees and  
12 Federal officers. What do they have to do with a  
13 Governor of a State or a State employee?

14 MR. DREEBEN: Well, they don't, Justice  
15 Alito. This case has been litigated on the submission  
16 that Section 201 informed the meeting of "official  
17 action" for purposes of the Hobbs Act and the honest  
18 services statute. And as a result, the parties have  
19 engaged very heavily on the effect on Federal officials.  
20 And I think that Justice Breyer's question was primarily  
21 directed at them.

22 I do think that there are different issues  
23 that arise with respect to State officials, but the mens  
24 rea requirements that I've been talking about are going  
25 to be fully applicable --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah, but how -- but you're  
2 asking --

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But then this -- this  
4 doesn't answer Justice Breyer's basic question and ours.  
5 You're going to tell the Senators, the officials with  
6 the lunches, that, don't worry. The jury has to be  
7 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's tough.

8 (Laughter.)

9 MR. DREEBEN: Well --

10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That was your answer.  
11 That was your answer.

12 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Kennedy, I do think  
13 that the requirements of the criminal law in proving  
14 something by beyond a reasonable doubt are a substantial  
15 --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: What is it they're trying  
17 to prove? Now, of course, this is a State case, not a  
18 Federal case. It's a State official -- it's a Federal  
19 law but a State official. I don't know. I've only been  
20 peripherally involved in political campaigns, but my  
21 peripheral convinces me that a candidate will go out and  
22 he'll have lunch with hundreds of people, hundreds.  
23 Everybody wants to give him lunch. Great. And -- and  
24 he wants to meet as many people as possible. He wants  
25 to be friendly. He might receive a raincoat. He might

1 receive all kinds of things. And at some point, it  
2 becomes very dishonest.

3 MR. DREEBEN: So --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: But that's a matter for  
5 campaign laws.

6 Wait. Now, I've also been involved in the  
7 Justice Department. And we would receive many, many  
8 letters in the antitrust division. Have you looked into  
9 such and such? I know perfectly well that that Senator  
10 just wants to go back to the constituent and say, see, I  
11 did my best. That's all.

12 Now, you're saying to the jury, take those  
13 facts I just gave you, and you look into the state of  
14 mind -- the state of mind of which the amounts being  
15 given will be somewhat indicative, of which the nature  
16 of the letter will be somewhat indicative, of whether he  
17 writes in personal writing at the bottom will be  
18 somewhat indicative, and we're going to let you 12  
19 people work out what was really in that Senator's mind.  
20 I say that is a recipe for giving the Department of  
21 Justice and the prosecutors enormous power over elected  
22 officials who are not necessarily behaving honestly.

23 And I am looking for the line. I am looking  
24 for the line that will control the shift of power that I  
25 fear without allowing too much honesty through this law.

1     You know, other laws exist on the other side.

2                     MR. DREEBEN:   Well, Justice --

3                     JUSTICE BREYER:   That -- that's what I want  
4     your view on.

5                     MR. DREEBEN:   Justice Breyer, I'm going to  
6     push back, because I think that the line that Petitioner  
7     has urged is one that is a recipe for corruption, not a  
8     recipe for drawing a safe harbor for public officials.

9                     What he has basically urged the Court to  
10    hold is that paying for access, if somebody does not put  
11    a thumb on the scale of decision -- if I, for example,  
12    tell the criminal division, take the meeting, make  
13    whatever recommendation is in your best judgment, just  
14    take the meeting, I can take money for that.   And I  
15    think the message that would be sent, if this Court put  
16    its imprimatur on a scheme of government in which public  
17    officials were not committing bribery when all they did  
18    was arrange meetings with other governmental officials,  
19    without putting, in his metaphorical way, a thumb on the  
20    scales of the ultimate decision, would send a terrible  
21    message to citizens.   What --

22                    JUSTICE ALITO:   Well, what I think we're  
23    looking for is some limiting principle.   Now, you -- you  
24    started to say something about campaign contributions --

25                    MR. DREEBEN:   Correct.

1 JUSTICE ALITO: -- and I know that this case  
2 doesn't involve campaign contributions. But certainly a  
3 campaign contribution can be the quid, can it not?

4 MR. DREEBEN: Certainly.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Well, gaining  
6 access by making campaign contributions is an everyday  
7 occurrence. And maybe it's a bad thing, but it's very  
8 widespread. How does it -- how does that play out?

9 MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Alito, gaining  
10 access and ingratiation and gratitude as a result of  
11 campaign contributions is not a crime. When it's done  
12 as a quid pro quo, it is. And that is not the --

13 JUSTICE BREYER: That's --

14 MR. DREEBEN: That is not the --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: That's what I want, your  
16 view.

17 MR. DREEBEN: That is not my view, Justice  
18 Breyer.

19 JUSTICE BREYER: But, I mean --

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Dreeben, if I could just  
21 follow up on that.

22 If a -- a Senator writes to a Federal agency  
23 and says, this union or this company is, you know,  
24 critical to the economy of my State, and, by the way --  
25 he doesn't say this, but, by the way, they are the



1 biggest contributors to his campaign -- would you please  
2 meet with them? What would not make that a crime? The  
3 fact that the jury might not find beyond a reasonable  
4 doubt that the reason why he was urging this meeting was  
5 because these people, this entity, happened to be a very  
6 big supporter? That would be the only thing separating  
7 lawful from unlawful conduct there?

8 MR. DREEBEN: Well, let -- let me say two  
9 things in response to that. First, this Court has  
10 addressed that very issue in the McCormick case. And it  
11 is established that merely taking favorable action at or  
12 around the time of the receipt of campaign contributions  
13 is not sufficient to show a quid pro quo and is not a  
14 crime.

15 Nobody doubts that if there's a quid pro quo  
16 for a vote, something that I think Mr. Francisco is  
17 prepared to concede is "official action," although I'm  
18 not sure why since it doesn't personally exercise  
19 sovereign power if a legislator casts vote as a  
20 dissenting vote from a majority action. But nobody  
21 disputes that that is a crime. Therefore, this Court  
22 has already carved out evidentiary and instructional  
23 safeguards that prevent against a jury inferring a quid  
24 pro quo merely from the coincidence of timing.

25 But I want to come back to something that is

1 even more fundamental, and that is the role of the First  
2 Amendment in this case. Because Petitioner has sought  
3 to wrap himself in the mantle of the First Amendment,  
4 probably because the gifts that he received have nothing  
5 to do with the First Amendment; they have to do with  
6 personal loans and luxury goods.

7 This is not a case about campaign  
8 contributions. But when campaign contributions are at  
9 issue, he relies very heavily on Citizens United while  
10 ignoring a critical piece of Citizens United.

11 This Court, in Citizens United, looked back  
12 to the circumstances that prompted the Federal Election  
13 Campaign Act in 1972, and those involve circumstances  
14 that were delineated in the Buckley decision in the  
15 court of appeals.

16 And the Court specifically cited to those  
17 practices. And what were those practices? They  
18 involved the American milk producers paying \$2 million  
19 in campaign contributions, spread out among a variety of  
20 committees, to get a meeting at the White House. That's  
21 all they did. They said, in order to gain a meeting  
22 with White House officials on price supports, they paid  
23 that money.

24 Other corporate executives testified that  
25 paying money was a calling card, something that would

1 get us in the door and make our point of view heard.  
2 And this Court said, on page 356 of the Citizens United  
3 opinion, "The practices Buckley noted would be covered  
4 by the bribery laws, CEG 18 U.S.C. 201, if a quid pro  
5 quo arrangement were proved."

6 Now, of course, it's very difficult to prove  
7 a quid pro quo arrangement, and that's why there are  
8 campaign finance limitations on contributions to  
9 candidates. But the Court had no doubt that paying for  
10 access was a criminal violation. And so --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So --

12 MR. DREEBEN: And that's what --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- if you have a  
14 governor whose priority is jobs for his State, and  
15 there's a CEO who's thinking about locating a plant in  
16 his State, but he can only do it, he says, if he gets  
17 tax credits from the State.

18 So the governor is talking to him, and he  
19 says, look, why don't you come down to my, you know,  
20 trout stream and we'll go fishing and we'll talk about  
21 this. And the governor does that. He has a nice day  
22 fishing for trout, and they talk about whether they can  
23 get tax credits, deferred taxes if the CEO opens his  
24 plant in the State. Now, is that a felony, because  
25 he's --

1 MR. DREEBEN: I --

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- accepted an  
3 afternoon of trout fishing, and he discussed official  
4 business at that time?

5 MR. DREEBEN: I don't think so, Mr. Chief  
6 Justice, but if you change the hypothetical and said  
7 instead of an afternoon of trout fitting -- fishing,  
8 I'll fly you out to Hawaii and you and your family can  
9 have a vacation, and during that time we can go over my  
10 policy --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I thought -- I  
12 didn't think the government put any weight on the amount  
13 of the quid; in other words, you know -- okay. I don't  
14 know how much an afternoon of trout fishing is worth,  
15 but I -- I gather you get -- you can be charged for that  
16 and -- and pay for it.

17 I thought that didn't matter. I thought it  
18 was whether he was engaged in an "official act" under  
19 circumstances in which a jury could find he did it  
20 because of the gift.

21 MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And -- and so if all  
23 he's doing is talking about ways to get jobs for  
24 Virginia, and he's talking with the person who's going  
25 to make that decision from the private sector, based in

1 part on whether or not he gets, you know, tax credits,  
2 it would seem to me that under your definition, that  
3 governor is guilty of a felony.

4 MR. DREEBEN: I'm not sure that he is guilty  
5 of a felony. But the reason why I changed the  
6 hypothetical to involve a larger quid is because the  
7 implications of carving something out from "official  
8 action" mean that it can be sold, and that it's lawful  
9 to be sold. And when you change the trout fishing to a  
10 trip to Hawaii, it becomes more nefarious, and the  
11 message that it sends to citizens is --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: But that's the point. You  
13 see, what -- exactly what the Chief Justice asked.  
14 What's the lower limit, in the government's opinion, on  
15 the quid? What? Tell me right now. What -- if you're  
16 going to say \$10,000, okay, I feel quite differently  
17 about this. If you will say an afternoon of trout  
18 fishing or et cetera, then I feel quite differently.  
19 It's pretty hard to see the conduct being honest if you  
20 exempt the campaign contributions and put it up  
21 somewhere. But I didn't think that was the government's  
22 position.

23 MR. DREEBEN: It's not the government's --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: What is the government's  
25 position -- what -- you tell me I'm wrong, in for a

1 penny, in for a pound. You tell me right now it is not  
2 the government's position that the trout fishing  
3 afternoon is sufficient to be a -- a quid. If you say  
4 that, I'll feel differently about the case.

5 (Laughter.)

6 MR. DREEBEN: It's tempting, Justice Breyer,  
7 but I'm not going to --

8 JUSTICE BREYER: Exactly.

9 MR. DREEBEN: -- exempt from the corruption  
10 laws --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.

12 MR. DREEBEN: -- certain types of quids.  
13 But --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: But now --

15 MR. DREEBEN: -- Justice Breyer, you do need  
16 to run this through all the elements of the offense. I  
17 think what Petitioner is -- is saying, and I think some  
18 of the Court's hypotheticals are suggesting the only  
19 thing that really you could possibly do to remedy this  
20 issue is to shrink the definition of "official action"  
21 with no textual basis in 201, nor really, I think, any  
22 common sense basis in the way that government actually  
23 operates --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: You tell me -- that's why I  
25 asked you at the beginning. And you -- in order to

1 be -- you say you're going to push back, and then you  
2 complained about their definition. If I thought their  
3 definition was so perfect, I wouldn't have asked you.  
4 And -- and it's -- it's exactly -- you do -- you tell me  
5 how to do this. And I'm not -- you say it sends a  
6 terrible message. I'm not in the business of sending  
7 messages in a case like this. I'm in the business of  
8 trying to figure out the structure of the government.  
9 And that's part of Separation of Powers, and I expressed  
10 my concern.

11 MR. DREEBEN: So I think --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: I dissented in -- in  
13 Citizens United, so whatever that said there, but --

14 (Laughter.)

15 JUSTICE BREYER: The -- the -- but the point  
16 is the one I raised at the beginning that every single  
17 one of us has raised. We're worried about -- because  
18 like any other organization, the prosecutors too can be  
19 overly zealous. That can happen. And so we need some  
20 protection on both sides, even though the line won't be  
21 perfect. And it will fail to catch some crooks. And it  
22 will -- I mean, I understand that. And -- and I want to  
23 know your view. And it doesn't even -- it helps a  
24 little, but not a lot, to say, well, meetings.

25 MR. DREEBEN: So --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: That's too specific. I  
2 want to know what your view is as to the language we  
3 write in discussing the line.

4 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don't think you and I  
5 agree on where the line should be, Justice Breyer. So  
6 I -- I can't write language that is going to satisfy  
7 you. You weren't even satisfied with Petitioner's  
8 language, which requires that there be influence on some  
9 other governmental decision. You suggested you thought  
10 that was too broad.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no, no. Well, yeah,  
12 yeah, yeah, yeah.

13 MR. DREEBEN: You did suggest it.

14 JUSTICE BREYER: I did --

15 (Laughter.)

16 MR. DREEBEN: I think that it's too narrow.  
17 I think that if the Court is going to reject the  
18 government's submission, which is that when the governor  
19 calls his Secretary of Health and says, take the meeting  
20 with my benefactor, he doesn't disclose it's his  
21 benefactor. Take the meeting so that that person can  
22 have the preferential opportunity that other citizens  
23 who do not pay will have to make his case before you. I  
24 think that is "official action."

25 Petitioner says it's not "official action"



1 unless he further sends the message, which I think on  
2 the facts of this case was sent, he's trying to  
3 influence the ultimate outcome.

4 If the Court is going to reject the  
5 government's position in this case, then I think that a  
6 fallback position for the government is when you have an  
7 indisputed "official action," such as will the  
8 universities of Virginia study a particular product, or  
9 will the Tobacco Commission fund it, then when a public  
10 official takes action to direct that decision, to  
11 influence that decision, or to advance his benefactor's  
12 interests with respect to that decision, that  
13 constitutes the crime of bribery.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There -- there is --

15 MR. DREEBEN: Now --

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Given the difficulty  
17 that we're having in settling on what these words in the  
18 statute mean, there is a -- an argument in the  
19 Petitioner's brief that you have responded to in yours  
20 that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

21 MR. DREEBEN: I -- I do not think it is  
22 unconstitutionally vague. First of all, we're talking  
23 here about multiple statutes. We're talking about Hobbs  
24 Act extortion, which this Court previously construed in  
25 both McCormick and Evans to be perfectly valid upon the

1 proof of a quid pro quo when the official asserts that  
2 his action will be controlled by a -- a thing of value  
3 that he has received.

4 And now we're talking about the question of  
5 what constitutes "official action" for the purposes of a  
6 common law crime that goes back centuries and was  
7 incorporated into the Hobbs Act.

8 We're also talking about the honest-services  
9 statute, which this Court in Skilling just six years ago  
10 determined could be construed --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, yeah. "Could  
12 be construed." I mean, there were, what, three votes to  
13 find it unconstitutional? And the others say, well, no,  
14 because you can narrow it in this way to the core  
15 definition of bribery. And now maybe the -- the  
16 experience we've had here, and the difficulty of coming  
17 up with clear enough instructions suggests that the  
18 caution the Court showed at that point was ill-advised.

19 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think it would be  
20 absolutely stunning if this Court said that bribery and  
21 corruption laws, which have been on the books since the  
22 beginning of this nation, and have been consistently  
23 enacted by Congress to combat both Federal, State, and  
24 local corruption --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would it be --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And --

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- absolutely stunning to  
3 say that the government has given us no workable  
4 standard?

5 MR. DREEBEN: Well, we have given you a  
6 workable standard. It's the standard that comes from  
7 this Court's 1914 decision in *Birdsall*, where the Court  
8 said that things that government officials do under a  
9 bribery statute much like this are covered as official  
10 action, and they're not limited to things that --

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Perhaps what you're  
12 talking about is how evil the conspiracy is. It's not  
13 evil to -- to fish or to have a bottle of wine, but it  
14 is evil if you up the ante. Is that -- is that what  
15 you're saying?

16 MR. DREEBEN: I think what I'm trying to  
17 say, Justice Kennedy, is that it's going to be extremely  
18 difficult for anyone to really believe that you could  
19 buy a Governor's position on a multimillion-dollar tax  
20 support for an afternoon of trout fishing. And that's  
21 why those cases don't get brought. No one thinks about  
22 them. It's not really even clear there is a *quid pro*  
23 *quo* for --

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can I ask you a narrower  
25 question, Mr. Dreeben?

1                   So one of the "official acts" here -- I'll  
2   just read it to you. It's allowing Jonnie Williams to  
3   invite individuals important to Star Scientific's  
4   business to exclusive events at the Governor's Mansion.

5                   MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

6                   JUSTICE KAGAN: So that's essentially  
7   hosting a party and allowing Mr. Williams to invite some  
8   people. And why does that -- why is that an "official  
9   act," in your view?

10                  MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Kagan, it wasn't  
11   hosting an official party. We're talking about here two  
12   events. One was a product launch hosted at the  
13   Governor's Mansion where the Governor is basically  
14   giving his credibility to a brand-new product. And the  
15   invitations were critical to Jonnie Williams' plan to  
16   sign up the universities to do the studies. He got to  
17   pick --

18                  JUSTICE KAGAN: So here's, I guess -- I  
19   mean, I guess, my question is this: The -- the  
20   "official act," the statute, the definition, I mean,  
21   requires that there be some particular matter, cause,  
22   suit, proceeding, or controversy, correct?

23                  MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

24                  JUSTICE KAGAN: And if I understand the  
25   theory of this case, the matter, suit, cause,

1 proceeding, or controversy here is the attempt to get  
2 the University of Virginia to do clinical studies of  
3 this product; is that correct?

4 MR. DREEBEN: It's narrower than our whole  
5 scope of the charge, but it's essentially correct.

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: That's the gravamen of the  
7 thing?

8 MR. DREEBEN: Correct.

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: So if you had just -- if --  
10 if the indictment, and then the instructions that were  
11 based on the indictment, had said the "official act" is  
12 getting the University of Virginia to do clinical  
13 studies, right, that reads very differently from the way  
14 this indictment was structured. Because what this  
15 indictment does is it takes a lot of different pieces of  
16 evidence that might relate to that "official act" and  
17 charges them as "official acts" themselves, so that the  
18 party becomes an "official act" or calling somebody just  
19 to talk about the product becomes an "official act." Do  
20 you see what I mean?

21 I mean, you know, this might have been  
22 perfectly chargeable and instructable, but I guess  
23 I'm -- I'm troubled by these particular charges and  
24 instructions, which seems to make every piece of  
25 evidence that you had an "official act," rather than

1 just saying the "official act" was the -- was the  
2 attempt to get the University of Virginia to do  
3 something that they wouldn't have done otherwise.

4 MR. DREEBEN: So, Justice Kagan, what the  
5 crime was here was the Governor accepting things of  
6 value in return for being influenced and taking  
7 "official actions" to legitimize, promote, and secure  
8 research studies for Anatabloc and Star's products.  
9 That's at Supplemental JA 14.

10 It then alleges that he would do this as  
11 opportunities arose in the course of his official  
12 actions. And because he's the Governor and he has a  
13 tremendous amount of influence throughout the  
14 government, he appoints all the board of visitors of VCU  
15 and UVA. He sets the budget. They know that he's an  
16 important guy. He has lots of opportunities to do this  
17 in different ways over time.

18 And if you look at the pattern of what he  
19 did, directing people to meet with Star's  
20 representatives, arranging events at the mansion in  
21 which Star could bring together its chosen guest list,  
22 the doctors who it wanted to influence with the Star  
23 people who were trying to influence it, the Governor is  
24 taking every step he can do short of saying to UVA, do  
25 the studies, which his chief counsel told him would be

1 inappropriate and wasn't going to do.

2           So I -- I think that if you look at the  
3 indictment the way that it's actually structured, it  
4 talks about a person who, as opportunities arose, was  
5 going to engage in "official acts." This is a theory of  
6 corruption that Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Ganim in  
7 the Second Circuit validated, and it was cited in  
8 Skilling as a perfectly valid theory of corruption.

9           And, therefore, the individual "official  
10 acts" really form a composite window into Petitioner's  
11 mind. Did he intend to allow his official conduct to be  
12 controlled by the things of value that he received? And  
13 taking them all together, even if the Court has trouble  
14 with any individual one, they allowed a rational jury to  
15 inference that, indeed, he did.

16           And the only way that Petitioner could win,  
17 if you agree with me on the sufficiency issue, is if you  
18 conclude that jury instructions must exempt certain  
19 types of official actions, like directing your Secretary  
20 of Health to take a meeting, which is a very kind of  
21 significant event in the life of a cabinet member and a  
22 governor, or hosting an event at the mansion, can't  
23 possibly count, because it somehow should be viewed as  
24 social, when, in fact, what the Governor is doing is  
25 allowing his benefactor to get all the people in the

1 room who he wants to influence to do the studies.

2 So in my view, there was nothing wrong -- if  
3 I can complete the sentence -- in the way that the  
4 indictment structured the crime in this case. The  
5 "official acts" were exemplary. They were proved, and  
6 the jury could properly find them.

7 Thank you.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

9 Mr. Francisco, five minutes remaining.

10 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NOEL J. FRANCISCO

11 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

12 MR. FRANCISCO: Thank you, Mr. Chief  
13 Justice.

14 I have three basic points I would like to  
15 make.

16 First, I'd like to start out with the  
17 government's argument that a lot of the problems with  
18 its theory are solved by the quid pro quo requirement.  
19 Well, in fact, the gratuity statute, the Federal  
20 gratuity statute, has the exact same "official act"  
21 requirement, but no quid pro quo requirement at all.

22 So what that means is that if you take  
23 somebody to a fancy lunch with a -- I can't remember the  
24 name of the bottle of wine you mentioned, Justice  
25 Breyer, but if you took them to that fancy lunch to



1     thank them for referring you to a meeting with a  
2     mid-level staffer, even if there was no suggestion at  
3     all that you were going to do anything other than call  
4     that staffer and say, hey, can you take a meeting with  
5     this guy, hear him out, and exercise your independent  
6     judgment, that would be a violation of the Federal  
7     gratuity statute.

8                     And, indeed, under the government's broad  
9     theory that anything within the range of official duties  
10    counts, that means that if you took the person out to  
11    that lunch as thanks for giving you a tour of the  
12    Capitol Building, you would likewise have violated the  
13    Federal gratuity statute, because there, there is no  
14    quid pro quo requirement at all.

15                    Point two, Justice Breyer --

16                    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:  There is a difference  
17    between someone saying, thank you for a decision you  
18    made independent of the gift -- that's the Sun Growers  
19    case -- and someone buying you an expensive lunch and  
20    saying, I'm paying for this lunch, but make sure I get a  
21    tour.  You don't see the difference?

22                    MR. FRANCISCO:  Not under the Federal  
23    gratuity statute, Your Honor, because the Federal  
24    gratuity statute is meant to prohibit thanking somebody  
25    for giving you an "official act."  And so if an

1 "official act" is, in fact, a tour of the Capitol  
2 Building or a meeting with a staffer, then you have, in  
3 fact, violated the Federal gratuity statute when you  
4 take them to lunch as a thanks for that particular act.

5 Second point, Justice Breyer, in trying to  
6 figure out the right verbal formulation, the first point  
7 I'd like to make is, if we can't figure out a proper  
8 verbal formulation, then I think there are some ver  
9 serious vagueness problems with the statute --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: It's Birdsall.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: It's Birdsall. Look, I  
13 can -- I've read the Brown Commission Report. I've read  
14 the Model Penal Code. I've read all these efforts to  
15 get language. And I've looked at the present statute.  
16 And I think I can limit that because the statute,  
17 itself, seems to cover things like voting and contracts,  
18 et cetera. But it's also true that a person who tries  
19 to influence those things has committed bribery. I  
20 think that's correct.

21 MR. FRANCISCO: And --

22 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, my problem is with  
23 Birdsall and how do we write those words so that they do  
24 catch people who are doing this dishonest thing without,  
25 as I've said five times, allowing the government the

1 freedom to go and do these ridiculous cases.

2 MR. FRANCISCO: And -- and I think the D.C.  
3 Circuit's en banc decision --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Not saying this is a  
5 ridiculous one, by the way.

6 MR. FRANCISCO: Understood, Your Honor. I  
7 think that the right answer, you start out with the D.C.  
8 Circuit's decision in Valdes. You look at that listing  
9 of words --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: Uh-huh.

11 MR. FRANCISCO: -- question, matter, suit,  
12 cause proceeding. And those are actual decisions that  
13 the government makes, the government as a whole, as a  
14 sovereign. And then you say, are you making a decision  
15 on that, if you're the final decisionmaker, or if you're  
16 not the final decisionmaker, but because of your  
17 official power, you have the -- the ability and the  
18 authority to influence other decision-makers, then  
19 you're -- are you doing that? Here are two  
20 fundamental --

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What do you say to  
22 Mr. Dreeben's argument that if we read this statute as  
23 you are urging, then every government official can say,  
24 you want to have a meeting? Pay me a thousand dollars.  
25 The corruption that's inherent in the position that says

1 it's okay to facilitate a meeting, it's okay to say,  
2 I'll do it for you if you pay me a thousand dollars.  
3 That's your view, that that would be okay?

4 MR. FRANCISCO: Your Honor, and, frankly,  
5 this was leading to my third point, which is, if there  
6 is absolutely no way that -- if there's no indicia that  
7 you're actually trying to influence the outcome, and it  
8 really is just a meeting, yes. But that reflects the  
9 fact that these broad and vague statutes are not  
10 comprehensive codes of ethical conduct. There are lots  
11 of other statutes that would prohibit precisely what you  
12 are suggesting, Justice O'Connor, and you don't have to  
13 interpret --

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That hasn't happened in  
15 quite some time.

16 (Laughter.)

17 MR. FRANCISCO: Justice Ginsburg. I am  
18 very, very, very sorry.

19 (Laughter.)

20 MR. FRANCISCO: Justice Ginsburg, my  
21 apologies.

22 There are lots of other statutes that would  
23 prohibit that precise conduct, and you don't need to  
24 take statutes like the Hobbs Act and honest-services  
25 statute.

1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, what would --  
2 Mr. Francisco, just take Mr. Dreeben's own example,  
3 which is the example of somebody -- he's running a  
4 business, and he's taking \$5,000 at a pop every time he  
5 arranges a meeting with the criminal division for  
6 somebody.

7 MR. FRANCISCO: Sure. There is a statute  
8 that prohibits supplementing your public salary with  
9 private money. So if you're essentially taking outside  
10 money for the performance of your official duties,  
11 that's illegal. That was discussed in the Sun-Diamond  
12 case.

13 There is another statute that -- that  
14 prohibits you from doing any -- taking anything from  
15 anybody whose interests could be substantially affected  
16 by the performance or nonperformance of your duties. So  
17 that's another one. It would prohibit -- that would  
18 prohibit it.

19 There is another provision of this bribery  
20 statute that prohibits you from taking any action, not  
21 just "official action" but any action in violation of  
22 your official duties. So I think that might --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why aren't they any less  
24 vague?

25 MR. FRANCISCO: Excuse me?

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why aren't they any less  
2 vague? And what you're saying is that holding a  
3 meeting, taking a phone call, having a party is not  
4 illegal, that that is something that you're entitled to  
5 do. So why would all those statutes be any less --

6 MR. FRANCISCO: They may well be in certain  
7 circumstances, but I think that the ones that are simply  
8 saying -- for example, the civil service statutes that  
9 simply say, you can't take anything from anybody who is  
10 a covered person. That's not vague. It just says that  
11 you can't take anything from anybody who is in your job.

12 Most Federal government officials are very  
13 familiar with that. That's why you really just don't  
14 take gifts from anyone. The problem here is that we had  
15 a State regime that was much less stringent than the  
16 Federal regime, and the government wanted to use the  
17 open-ended Hobbs Act and honest-services statute to fill  
18 that gap in what they perceived is the State law.

19 I would respectfully submit that that is an  
20 inappropriate use of Federal power.

21 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

23 Mr. Dreeben, could I invite you to return to  
24 the lectern? Our records reflect that this was your  
25 one-hundredth oral argument before the Court. You are

1 the second person to reach that rare milestone this  
2 century.

3 I distinctly recall your first argument in  
4 January of 1989. Throughout your career, you have  
5 consistently advocated positions on behalf of the  
6 United States in an exemplary manner.

7 On behalf of the Court, I extend to you our  
8 appreciation for the many years of advocacy and  
9 dedicated service during your tenure in the Solicitor  
10 General's Office and as an officer of this Court.

11 We look forward to hearing from you many  
12 more times. Thank you.

13 The case is submitted.

14 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you.

15 (Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the  
16 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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			<b>10,000</b> 45:16 <b>10:02</b> 1:13 3:2 <b>1083</b> 18:3 <b>11:04</b> 63:15 <b>12</b> 38:18 <b>14</b> 54:9 <b>15-474</b> 1:4 3:4 <b>18</b> 16:17 43:4 <b>1914</b> 51:7 <b>1972</b> 42:13 <b>1989</b> 63:4	
			<b>2</b>	
			<b>2</b> 42:18 <b>201</b> 14:9 36:16 43:4 46:21 <b>2016</b> 1:9 <b>27</b> 1:9 <b>28</b> 2:7	
			<b>3</b>	
			<b>3</b> 2:4	